During an ongoing regional crisis, adversary influence accounts have infiltrated a closed DoD discussion forum. A rumor alleging insider negligence in a recent cyber breach spreads across unit channels, seeding inter-service blame and eroding command credibility. Adversary TTPs include coordinated narrative seeding, cross-platform amplification, identity-based polarization, and suppression of internal deliberation. Select a role to begin.
Blue Team
Defend the Unit
Monitor multi-channel feeds. Detect, verify, and counter influence operations under real-time operational pressure. 5 decision injects with branching outcomes and live scoring.
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Red Team
Execute the Campaign
Plan and execute the cognitive influence operation. Select attack vectors, targeting strategies, and amplification tactics. Learn adversary tradecraft from the inside. 5 attack phases.
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Facilitator
Classroom Dashboard
Monitor simulated cohort decision patterns in real time. Track detection rates, response quality, and trust metrics. Structured debrief prompts with negative learning guidance.
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AI Engine
Generate Scenarios
Describe your exercise context in natural language. The AI generates PF/PTech/PTac-tagged injects aligned to your theater, echelon, and DISARM TTPs. Deploys directly to Blue Team.
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A1
Cognitive Fidelity
A2
Scenario Realism
A3
Automation & Adaptability
A4
Training & Assessment
A5
Attacker-Defender Integration
Framework Alignment — CWEI Evaluation Attributes
A1 — Cognitive Fidelity: Explicitly embeds PFs (Authority, Conformity, Social Identity, Fear), PTechs (Urgency Framing, Identity Framing, False Context), and PTacs (Narrative Seeding, Cross-Platform Amplification, Brigading) with visible indicators during gameplay.
A2 — Scenario Realism: Models realistic DoD unit-level communication channels (unit chat, social media, news outlets, intelligence alerts) with multiple actor roles and evolving rumor cascades calibrated to battalion/brigade echelon.
A4 — Educational Value: Real-time scoring of detection rate, response time, decision quality, and trust preservation. Three-phase AAR connects player decisions to cognitive mechanisms and adversarial objectives.
A5 — Defense-Attack Symmetry: Mandatory role selection ensures participants experience both defender and attacker perspectives. Red Team debrief reveals the attack logic Blue Team was countering, directly addressing A5 integration. Rushing & Xu · UCCS Laboratory for Cybersecurity Dynamics · thebonnierushing.com
// Joint Force Training Exercise
Operation Echo Chamber
🛡 Blue Team — Defender
Mission Brief
You are a unit staff officer (O-4 to O-6 echelon) monitoring your unit's information environment during an ongoing regional crisis. Adversary influence accounts have infiltrated your closed DoD discussion forum and are executing a coordinated cognitive attack campaign across 5 sequential injects.
Cognitive Superiority — Rushing & Xu
"Cognitive superiority is a condition in which one actor maintains a sustained comparative advantage in the cognitive domain — achieving objectives at higher speed and cost-effectiveness than its opponent within the OODA cycle."
Your goal: preserve your OODA loop integrity while denying the adversary this advantage.
Defender Objectives
DAO1 — Preserve shared situational awareness
DAO2 — Maintain accurate interpretation
DAO3 — Protect decision tempo and quality
DAO4 — Execute without misalignment
Each inject targets a different stage of your decision cycle. Observe accurately · Orient without bias · Decide under pressure · Act with coordination · Adapt as the campaign escalates. Your response speed and quality are both measured.
// Adversary Influence Operations
Operation Echo Chamber
🎯 Red Team — Attacker
Operator Brief
You are an adversary influence operator executing a coordinated cognitive campaign against a DoD unit. Your goal is to achieve cognitive superiority — completing your OODA cycle faster and more cost-effectively than the defender can respond across 5 attack phases.
Cognitive Superiority — Rushing & Xu
"Cognitive superiority is a condition in which one actor maintains a sustained comparative advantage in the cognitive domain — achieving objectives at higher speed and cost-effectiveness than its opponent within the OODA cycle."
Your goal: complete your OODA cycle faster than the defender can respond, degrading their decision performance while preserving your own.
Attacker Objectives
AAO1 — Degrade shared situational awareness
AAO2 — Bias interpretation via framing
AAO3 — Increase decision latency and error
AAO4 — Elicit misaligned action or inaction
Each phase maps to one OODA stage. Observe the unit · Orient your narrative · Decide on vectors · Act with coordinated injects · Adapt to defender responses. Your cycle speed drives the Cognitive Superiority Index (CSI).
⚡ Operation Echo Chamber
Cognitive Wargame — Information Operations Training
· 38% chose Monitor — what information were you waiting for, and at what cost to coalition coordination?
· Only 2/12 verified the attributed AF statement — discuss how attribution chains feel authoritative before verification.
· PF: Social identity bias — name a time inter-service friction shaped your assumptions. That is the exact mechanism targeted.
· Negative learning risk: Verification is necessary but not sufficient — coordination costs of delayed response are real even when verification succeeds.
Countermeasures
Friction Post
Slowing rumor spread via narrative friction countermeasure
Fact Check
Debunking false claims via media literacy countermeasure
Describe your exercise context. The AI generates injects tagged with DISARM anchors, PFs, PTechs, PTacs, and Blue Team response options. Requires internet connection.
Generated Scenario — Review Before Deploying
Generator Guide
· Specify the command echelon to calibrate authority structures and communication channels in the generated injects.
· Name specific DISARM TTPs to ensure injects activate the right psychological mechanisms.
· Include existing tensions in Additional Context — inter-service friction, coalition dynamics, recent incidents.
· Generated injects are reviewed and editable before deploying to Blue Team mode.
DISARM Reference
Deceptive Identity
Misrepresenting source to gain credibility
Narrative Laundering
Misleading narratives through legitimate intermediaries
Polarization
Fracturing groups by emphasizing identity-based divisions
Harassment & Intimidation
Suppressing participation or dissent in target populations